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1 INTRODUCTION  
In the quest for a more sustainable mobility, present mobility planning approaches do not prove effective. 
In particular in the case of large infrastructure projects (LIPs) this becomes manifest; realising LIPs has 
become tremendously difficult these days, resulting in many stranded projects. Previous LIP-research has 
shown that complexity is behind these struggles, in all its facets. Although decision makers often still focus 
merely on financial, technical and legal issues of complexity (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Priemus, 2007), it becomes 
increasingly clear that the influence of social and organizational complexity is heavily underestimated with 
respect to planning processes and procedures, see Figure 1 (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010).  
 
Figure 1. Views of complexity from multiple LIPs: Betuweroute, Gotthard, Lötschberg, A73-South and HSL-South. 
Source: Hertogh and Westerveld (2010, p. 175, figure 4.8)  
 
The social component of complexity relates to the number and representation of the actors and the 
alignment of their (conflicting) demands. Often, the decision making process is still in the hands of vested 
planning actors favouring backroom politics. The organisational aspect of complexity, that is closely 
connected to the social component, focuses on the (power) relation between the stakeholders, the 
responsibilities, the appropriate scale levels, etc. The fact that up till now – with respect to LIPs – the focus 
stays on the financial costs, the risks and opportunities relating to the progress in time, and the technical 
aspects (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Priemus, 2007) points towards the prevailing technocratic planning approach, 
towards the notion of the (mobility) planner as engineer. While this planning perspective used to pay off, 
more recently however, other mobility planning approaches have been sought for, since “complexity 
strikes back if it is neglected” (Salet, Bertolini, & Giezen, 2013, p. 1989). Hence, the central question here 
is: (1) What can such new complexity embracing mobility planning approach add to LIP planning 
processes? , and (2) What does this mean for the actors and their roles? We hereby also consider recent 
attempts to work with complexity in the policy fields of mobility and spatial planning, and what they have 
obtained so far.  
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of why we need to grasp complexity in 
the planning process and to which extent these ideas are already implemented. In chapter 3 we test these 
ideas and planning approach with vested planning actors in the case study of the Oosterweel Link. But first 
we have to take you through the project history of this case. Chapter 4 presents the discussion and final 
conclusions on what coevolution can add to LIP-planning processes.  
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2 EMBRACING COMPLEXITY IN MOBILITY PLANNING  
Many mobility planning strategies, and LIP strategies in particular, still focus too much on the 
implementation or the input-output story. Furthermore, too often LIPs are handled within the sole field of 
infrastructure and public works, while the interests and implications reach most other policy fields and even 
plans as well (finance, economy, environment, spatial planning, labour, etc.). Hence, a lot more 
stakeholders (government bodies, civil movements and other societal stakeholders) enter the planning 
scene, making alignment more difficult in the planning process.  
Apart from the various interests and claims during the project, also knowledge is quickly accumulating 
through the years, so the processes (or throughput) themselves should have more autonomy in such LIPs. 
(G. R. Teisman, 2008). Nowadays, planning strategies often still remind us too much of an stepwise action 
plan. Based on linear think patterns a somewhat naive and reductionist trajectory is defined towards a 
clearly and a-priori defined goal: the implementation (Paredis & Block, 2015; Priemus, 2007; Salet et al., 
2013; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). In many cases, however, planning strategies are not 
just standard formulas, they have to fit the specificity of the situation (time, place, actor constellations, 
environment, etc.).  
In dealing with this complex reality the concept of complex adaptive system (CASs) increasingly gains 
attention in several fields: public administration (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010; Pel & Teisman, 2009; G. 
Teisman, van Buuren, & Gerrits, 2009; G. R. Teisman, 2008), spatial planning (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; 
Van Assche, Beunen, & Duineveld, 2013; Van Assche, Beunen, Jacobs, & Teampau, 2011), and on the 
interplay between spatial planning and mobility in LIPs (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010; Salet et al., 2013). 
Processes of self-organisation and coevolution are at the heart of CASs (Boelens & De Roo, 2014; G. R. 
Teisman, 2008; Van Brussel, Boelens, & Lauwers, 2016), pointing out the delusion of a complete steering. 
We particularly built on the work on LIPs of Hertogh and Westerveld (2010) and their ‘dynamic 
management’
1
 approach to deal with the encountered complexity. But what can such a coevolution 
framework add to the LIP planning processes? Therefore we turned towards one of the largest and most 
complex LIP cases in Belgium and confronted some of the key stakeholders with these concepts and 
approaches in a round table discussion. 
  
Figure 2. The Oosterweel LIP process distinguishing the different actor groups 
 and their interconnections (own elaboration) 
  
3 CASE LIP OOSTERWEEL LINK  
The Oosterweel Link LIP (Antwerp, Belgium) is the research object of this case study for several reasons. 
The project process is already long lasting, the project is controversial and the process can be 
characterised by various rounds of opposition resulting in change. Furthermore, there is a sense of 
urgency as the congested mobility situation necessitates action. Describing the project process we focus 
on the different actor groups and there interactions, see Figure 2. The big project tracks or actor groups 
                                                            
1
 We do not like the ‘management’ word in ‘dynamic management’, as in our opinion a complete steering can never be 
reached. But we see in the approach however the elements of or parallels with a certain manoeuvring for coevolution: 
the search for alignment, the changing actor field, changing conditions, etc. (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010)  
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involved are the Flemish government, the Flemish parliament, the City of Antwerp, the project 
management team appointed by the Flemish Government (i.e. BAM), and the activist groups or citizen 
movements. We also shed light on other protagonists in the story that took the role of game changers: the 
governor of the Antwerp province and the intendant (respectively in beginning of the project and in most 
recent project years).  
  
3.1 THE OOSTERWEEL LINK STORY  
3.1.1 ONCE UPON A TIME AN OPTIMISTIC AND FUTURISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE STORY STARTS… 
(1995-2005)  
In 1995 the Flemish Agency for Roads and Traffic launched the start of a new masterplan to counter the 
structural congestion in and around Antwerp. The completion of the Antwerp ring road with the Oosterweel 
Link (Figure 3) was perceived the crown jewel of the masterplan that would solve all problems. The 
Oosterweel Link was conceived as a combination of a tunnel with a double deck viaduct called ‘Lange 
Wapper’. The governor of the Antwerp province, Camille Paulus, was in favour of these infrastructure 
designs. To define the precise route of the LIP a study was carried out by ABM (Atenco, Belgroma – 
Grontmij, and Maunsell). This study came up 
with 6 plausible routes, but in the end a 7th 
possibility was added, a combination of parts 
of the previous options. The City of Antwerp, 
the Port of Antwerp, the province of Antwerp, 
the Flemish administration and some other 
institutions approved this ‘optimised medium 
route’, which later became notorious as the 
‘BAM-route’. Only this route would be further 
studied and elaborated (Verhoeven & 
Ysebaert, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Oosterweel Link section (red). 
Source: Het Nieuwsblad, March 4, 2009, 
http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf04032009_049)  
 
In 2001 a consultancy consortium (TV SAM) 
was commissioned by the Flemish Government to elaborate that route. To promote the masterplan and to 
acquire the necessary support base a States-General was organised by the governor, bringing most 
vested institutions and agencies together, but only little publicity was given to it. By 2003, a management 
company was established (BAM, Beheermaatschappij Antwerpen Mobiel) to take over the project 
management and to replace the role of the Flemish administration in fulfilling the framework agreement 
with TV SAM, as a private company that functions independent of political interference. A close 
collaboration between the consultants of TVSAM and BAM started. When determining and securing the 
route of the LIP in a regional implementation plan (GRUP), they preferred to follow the (at that moment still 
optional) environmental impact assessment procedures.  
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3.1.2 THE AWAKENING – AFTER HAVING SEEN THE MODEL AND THE COST INCREASE… (2005-
2009)  
 
Figure 4. Model of the Lange Wapper dubble deck viaduct skimming over the City of Antwerp without and with 
underlying urban fabric. Source: (right) http://4.bp.blogspot.com; and 
(left)http://www.bavo.biz/img/images/langewapper%2012.jpg.  
 
When the BAM, in 2005, eventually showed the model of the Oosterweel Link to the press and the Flemish 
parliament, it caused a lot of commotion and reactions were almost unanimous enthusiastic. But it was met 
with great resistance afterwards, during the public inquiry of that procedure where the model was shown 
for the general public for the first time. stRaten-generaal, an activist group, came with its own alternative 
route suggesting to alleviate the city from transit traffic and complete the ring road much further away. The 
City of Antwerp was alarmed and wanted to buy time before making a decision. An extra study of the 
alternatives was launched: the Horvat study (carried out by Horvat). In addition to the BAM-route with the 
Lange Wapper viaduct, this study also took into 
account the tunnel variant of the BAM-route 
(called Horvat-route) and the alternative of 
stRaten-generaal. The research took only two 
months after which one concluded that a tunnel 
option was more expensive than a viaduct. 
Hence the approval was given for the viaduct 
landmark and the tunnel option was 
abandoned. Building consortia were notified for 
designing, elaborating and implementing the 
BAM-route.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Tunnel variant of the Oosterweel Link on 
the BAM-route (Horvat). Source: 
http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf04032009_049  
 
Finally four consortia were retained for 
submitting their ‘best and final offer’. An independent quality division (‘kwaliteitskamer’), existing of national 
and international experts in the field and chaired by the governor, was established to examine and criticize 
these BAFO’s and advise the management company BAM on their final decision. Soon preference was 
given to the offer of the Noriant consortium and the other consortia were excluded, though their final offer 
was criticized by the quality division for not being the most economical, nor most qualitative one. It 
appeared that the governor had an eye to the architectural beauty of the Lange Wapper viaduct for his 
province (Penris & Peumans, 2007).  
In parliament they had difficulty to accept that alternative routes were still taken into account during the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA, MER), while the building consortia had to finalise their BAFO’s 
according to the BAM-route. In addition, by absence of valid competitors, the total cost of the Oosterweel 
Link proposal could increase from 0.6 to 1.3 billion euros. This raised many questions about the 
communication and the transparency of the BAM and the opposition towards the deal with Noriant grew 
from then on. The precise roles and relations between TV SAM and BAM remained vague and the 
budgetary resources for the conducted research were repeatedly questioned. In response, BAM 
commissioned PWC and Deloitte for an external audit of TV SAM. The commission decided to follow the 
dossier more closely from then on. From 2005, regular progress reports were to be presented by BAM in 
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the parliamentary commission and also the Court of Audit of Belgium monitored the made progress 
(Peumans & Penris, 2005). Nonetheless, due to the accumulated delays and compensation measures, the 
total cost estimates continued rising. Therefore, at the end of 2007 the Flemish Government established a 
price cap for the project of 1.8 billion euros (Penris & Peumans, 2007, p. 7).  
  
3.1.3 FROM LANDMARK TO … SCRATCH? (2008-2012)  
In 2008, Ademloos (‘Breathless’) a new civil movement stood up to put the harmful environmental health 
impact of such an infrastructure project on the Antwerp citizen on the agenda. Ademloos came up with the 
aspect of health and air quality and was experienced with communication strategies, whereas stRaten-
generaal mainly focused on the technical aspects (e.g. alternative route), and quality of life issues in 
general. A fruitful collaboration between the two civil movements had started, whereby each organisation 
remained faithful to its own specialty.  
Under the pressure of an increasing opposition against the Oosterweel Link project, the Flemish 
government decides to have all alternative routes for the project studied once more (L.B., 2010). In July 
2008, when Arup/Sum starts the investigation of which the stakes are high. However, when in March 2008 
the results of this study are presented, none of the proposed routes excels the others regarding all 
measured aspects. Consequently Arup/Sum proposes to elaborate an alternative route itself, whereby the 
third crossing of the river Scheldt is located more northerly, similar to the proposal of stRaten-generaal. 
The Flemish government approves this additional work, but does not want to wait for the conclusions and 
has instructed BAM to continue on the chosen path. While Arup/Sum is elaborating its alternative route 
(Arup/Sum-route), according to their decision of March 28, 2009, the Flemish government instructs the 
BAM to file the building permission for the implementation of the Lange Wapper. But due to the Arup/Sum 
study the final agreement on the routing of the project was postponed for the next legislature.  
Soon after the decision, the civil movements launched a petition against the BAM-route of the Oosterweel 
Link project and together they managed to enforce a referendum. Their support base grew steadily 
(Moolenaar, 2008; Verelst, 2011, pp. 163-165,185). On October 18 (2009) on their first public event they 
victoriously terminated the Lange Wapper chapter in the Oosterweel Link story as the majority of the 
citizens voted against the viaduct in the referendum (Vandenbergh, 2009). The civil movements criticized 
that their proposed route was not taken into account properly in the EIA (projectMER), which they could 
only consult much later when the damage was done. Besides, the building consortia were already notified 
to elaborate an infrastructure design for the Lange Wapper viaduct on the BAM-route while the 
environmental impact assessment, comparing the different alternatives, was not yet concluded.  
In July 2009, completely unexpectedly, the further research of Arup/Sum concludes that the studied 
Arup/Sum-route tunnel alternative is technically feasible and economically viable. But more important, that 
at all levels their alternative performs better than the Lange Wapper viaduct on the BAM-route. Swayed by 
the growing civil opposition the City of Antwerp organises a referendum at October 18 (2009) that results 
in the rejection of the Lange Wapper viaduct (Brinckman, 2010). Consequently as the permits and plans 
were delivered precisely for the viaduct structure, the procedures of the regional spatial implementation 
plan and the associated EIAs (and their public inquiries) had to be redone for the tunnel-variant on the 
same route. Because of the referendum the project had changed substantially and a new full-rebidding 
was unavoidable. This compromised the financial agreement that was already made with the building 
consortium Noriant for the Lange Wapper (Dendooven, 2010; Verstraete, 2010).  
In 2010 the Flemish government promised to take a final decision in the Oosterweel case running through 
the alternatives once more and include them in the environmental impact assessments. This fits within the 
launch of a new Masterplan 2020, that has a broadened scope and looks for a total and multimodal 
solution for mobility and includes mitigating measures compensating for quality of life aspects.  
In the meantime, the civil movements elaborate their alternative the ‘Meccano-route’, an optimization of the 
Arup/Sum-route (that in turn was based on the previous stRaten-generaal-route). Together with Forum  
2020, a group of influential experts and managers in Antwerp, they have their Meccano-route studied by 
an independent research institute (TML). The results of the TML study comparing Meccano-route with the 
BAM-route are favourable to the Meccano-route (Yperman & De Ceuster, 2010). In response, the Flemish 
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administration instructed the Flemish Traffic Agency to investigate the TML-study (Grispen, 2011). It 
seemed like a cat-and mouse game with 
high stakes.  
In 2012 a new research institute 
(Anteagroup) is entrusted to carry out the 
environmental impact assessment, in 
which in addition to the BAM-route (tunnel 
variant) and the Meccano-route, five other 
alternatives are included (one of which is 
the Oosterweel North-route), see Figure 6. 
The implementation of the tangents A102 
and R11bis is already incorporated in the 
Masterplan 2020 at that moment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The alternatives investigated in the 
environmental impact assessment. Source: De 
Standaard  
  
3.1.4 A NEW BREATH FOR THE ANTWERP CITIZEN (2012-2015)  
Since air quality and environmental health has entered the debate in 2008, the theme of (partially) capping 
or tunnelling some major roads would never disappear. Through research by design, the City of Antwerp 
looks into the feasibility and impact of capping (parts) of the city road network. In November 2012, 
Ringland, a new civil movement in Antwerp stands up and launches the idea of capping the southern ring 
road. It is the dawn of a new era of civil opposition.  
In 2014 Anteagroup finalises the EIA (planMER Oosterweel) on the basis of which the Flemish 
government decides on February 14 to follow the chosen path of the BAM-route (stated policy, ‘beslist 
beleid’). To refrain from further legal actions Noriant received a settlement of 37.19 million euros (Moens, 
2014), a measure that was met with dismay in parliament.  
On the same day of the Valentine’s decision of the government, the Ringland initiative officially arose, 
proclaiming the capping of the ring to ameliorate the liveability and health of the citizens, in combination 
with a new concept for the ring road structure. This implementation alternative to the southern part of the 
ring road was partly inspired by the capped M30 in Madrid and suggested earlier by stRaten-generaal. 
Beyond problem solving, Ringland (the land on the ring road) was especially well-developed and 
presented as an opportunity for enhancing and managing a qualitative and liveable urban growth. First the 
concept was elaborated within the urban planning and architecture office Stramien. Using appealing 
representations of this concept (Figure 7), 
Peter Vermeulen, the leading urbanist of this 
office, and his Ringland entourage steadily 
gained ground. The civil support base reached 
even further than the Antwerp city. The other 
activist groups joined the new spirit and 
collaborated with Ringland. The opposition to 
the BAM project gained a more positive public 
image.  
  
Figure 7. Ringland, the concept. Source: Ringland  
 
In three months’ time, by the end of 2014, Ringland had collected more than 100 000 euro, by symbolically 
selling the land on the surface of the ring (4m² for €20). Ringland spent this crowd funding money on extra 
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research: a mobility study, a cost benefit study and a liveability study (E.D.M., 2015). StRaten-generaal 
and Ademloos launched an online call to publicly vote for Ringland and, thus, against the spatial 
implementation plan of Oosterweel (GRUP Oosterweel) (Ademloos, 2015). Embracing social media, finally 
over 15.000 statements of objections were obtained. This gave the opposition groups the right to speak in 
the Flemish Parliament on July 2 (De Standaard, 2015).  
In the field however, the preparatory works already started in the end of 2015 (B.B.R., 2015). As the 
opposition parties and many citizens support Ringland, the government decided to establish an ‘intendant’ 
(an idea prompted by Ringland itself); this external person should harmonise the Ringland and the BAM 
project, bring all actors together and look for opportunities to pursue a maximal capping of the ring road 
within the project margins as negotiated with the BAM. For the latter reason opposition groups were 
sceptical and expected little room for manoeuvre for the intendant, thus little outcome.  
In the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, Ringland starts a new campaign and launches the the 
Ringland Academy, bringing together a wider group of experts and professionals beyond the core 
Ringland team. They offer ad-hoc inputs into Ringland’s activities, contribute to ongoing study work, and 
develop projects related to one of the core-themes of Ringland. The CurieuzeNeuzen air quality citizen 
science project has been one of the main outputs of the Ringland Academy up to now. Aside from its 
objective to better understand air quality problems in Antwerp, CurieuzeNeuzen was created to sensitize 
and trigger Antwerp citizens (and politicians) about their living environment and the urgency for action with 
respect to traffic-related air pollution. As such, Ringland manages to increase its support base by inventing 
themselves over and over again.  
  
3.1.5 WORKING WITH THE INTENDANT – LANDING OR STRANDING? (2016-…)  
In the end of 2015 after public tendering, Alexander D’Hooghe is selected as ‘intendant’ or mediator; he is 
a professor at the MIT and experienced with participatory processes, e.g. in the ‘Rebuild by design’ 
initiative in the aftermath of the passage of hurricane Sandy in New York. In January 2016, he starts 
inviting all stakeholders to hear and discuss their ambitions and values in the story. Within six months he 
should deliver an ambition paper, in which the outlines for a maximal capping of the ring road are 
formulated and supported by all stakeholders. Some find his mandate too limited, as the BAM and the 
Flemish Government only commissioned the investigation of the capping options, leaving an inquiry of the 
mobility system underneath out of discussion. During his mandate he gained the trust of all stakeholders 
and the privately and confined or ‘safe’ atmosphere in which the ‘super workshops’ took place to elaborate 
opportunities, collaborate and discuss a possible compromise payed off quite well already. For the 
southern part a political compromise was reached and supported by all stakeholders (City of Antwerp, the 
civil movements, the Flemish administration and the Minister) (Huyse, 2016; Van Ginneken, 2016). For the 
northern part the debates and private meetings are still ongoing at the time of writing. Stakes are high, as 
the three civil movements already collected enough signatures to enforce a second referendum in 
Antwerp, in case the government would not 
postpone the submission of the building permit for 
the Oosterweel Link till after the intendant finishes 
his work within the different workshops (Huyse, 
2016; Vermeulen & BELGA, 2016). It seems that a 
compromise is in the making, the intendant and the 
major stakeholders still elaborate a new option – a 
combination of the BAM-proposal (Oosterweel Link 
but ‘light’ version) and that of the citizen movements 
(a capping of the whole ring road and the completion 
of the ring further north of the city)(see Figure 8), but 
it is not sure if the project will land or strand in the 
coming weeks (Brinckman, 2017).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Compromise proposed by intendant. Source: 
Brinckman (2017)  
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3.2 ROUNDTABLE OUTCOMES – THE OOSTERWEEL LINK PROCESS FROM THE 
STAKEHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVE  
 
Figure 9. Participants roundtable Complex Infrastructure projects – Universiteitsclub UA, Thursday May, 26 2016 
  
3.2.1 COEVOLUTION? IDENTIFYING CLICK-MOMENTS  
In the roundtable we confronted the participants with the whole project history again, just like we took you 
through the project in the previous section. The challenge was to bring the key-stakeholders
1
 in the 
process together (Figure 9), to hear about how they perceived the encountered complexities, and to see if 
they could sympathize with each other’s perspectives and decisions at several crucial moments in the 
project process. To cope with the encountered complexity, we focused on a coevolutionary approach, 
incorporating elements of the ‘dynamic management’ as proposed by Hertogh and Westerveld (2010), in 
which sufficient flexibility is guaranteed, but in which the omnipresent urgency to act can also be 
responded to (focus on control on several moments). The various stakeholders could see the merits of 
such approach and were asked about how they perceived the coevolution in the process. They ended up 
with identifying key-moments or ‘click’-moments (as some proposed) that were decisive for the rest of the 
(coevolutionary) process. However according to the civil movements some of these click-moments were 
ambiguous as they seemed to leave some possibilities open for alternative options.  
As a first click-moment all participants identified the moment in the 2nd round, in 2008, in which the results 
of the Arup/Sum alternatives assessment were presented and the moment had potential. The alternatives 
were assessed and compared based on various criteria. When the bureau proposed to conduct a follow-up 
study because it was concluded that none of the proposed routes excelled all the others, the Flemish 
government made the ‘fatal mistake’ to make of this moment an ambiguous click-moment according to the 
roundtable participants: the government commissioned Arup/Sum to carry out this further research (i.e. 
non-click but open), while at the same time the BAM was commissioned to prepare the building permission 
(i.e. click). The roundtable argued that the government should have taken a break and set the Oosterweel 
Link procedures ‘on hold’. By the made decision trust was compromised and polarisation increased. 
Everyone agreed that a pause was not sufficient, one should have switched to a co-creative approach 
already back then.  
A second click-moment, in particular concerning the civil movements was the decision of the Flemish 
government in 2011 to assess all alternatives once and for all in a final environmental impact assessment. 
At that moment, the civil movements cherished hopes that all their suggestions and supplied ideas would 
be taken into account seriously. However, after a while this feeling of trust disappeared by lack of 
sustained communication, which is – according to the administration – inherent to the formal procedures. 
Also the transparency with which the alternative options were adopted and modelled in the assessment 
was criticized. Not all alternatives were taken into account on the same grounds. This prompted the civil 
movements to file a legal complaint as their last hope.  
                                                            
1
 Also the Alderman for Mobility of the city of Antwerp (K. Kennis), the governor of the Antwerp province (C. Berx), and a 
representative from VOKA (the Chamber of Commerce, representing the Flemish entrepreneurial sector) were invited 
and willing to join, but were eliminated after a doodle round of checking agendas. 
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For some roundtable participants the exact click might have happened a bit earlier: on the moment that the 
Flemish government decides on the ‘optimised medium-route’ (the later BAM-route) already in round 1. 
Some argue that once the political choice is made, one should respect that decision and one cannot call 
that into question over and over again. Otherwise the project stagnates and opposition increases. But not 
all participants agree with that, as they argue that the process was not transparent enough, not well-
communicated, there was no participation at all and thus no broad support base as the project was steered 
completely internally. Besides, on various moments unfair treatment of alternatives or decision made with 
conflicts of interest, made these decisions unstable. Furthermore, the enduring protest against the project 
has broadened the project scope: quality of life aspects, a redesign of the mobility system, the aspect of air 
quality and the concept of capping, etc. were initially not on the agenda.  
The civil movements argue that it is only logical that the process has to be redone, since the project scope 
has more than doubled. But the participants representing the administrations replied that the question is 
rather ‘how long can the government as client last without a solution?’ They point out the risks of taking 
more than you can actually handle, of overcharging the project. Because that would make the project fail. 
As such they are in favour of not questioning previous decisions. But there is no lacking sense of urgency, 
but according to some, although the problem is clear, the problem solution(s) and precise objectives are 
not (!) and are still frequently questioned. Is a third crossing of the river Scheldt actually necessary and 
solve the problem? Even that is questioned, so, how can we decide already?  
A final indicated click-moment is the decision of the Flemish government to definitively choose for the 
BAM-route (see round 4). However this felt for all roundtable participants also as a quite ambiguous click 
as the government had just appointed an intendant (this idea was prompted by Ringland) to align all actors 
and build a broad support base for the capping (cf. idea of civil movements) of the Oosterweel Link project 
(on the BAM-route). Most participants had at the moment of the round table just started an intensive and 
private cooperation process guided by this intendant, the mandate of which was according to the civil 
movements and most experts in the debate too limited. Wasn’t this also a moment for a pause to alleviate 
the ongoing processes of this intendant?  
  
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Realising large infrastructure projects (LIPs) has become tremendously difficult nowadays and many 
projects strand. Although decision makers often still focus merely on financial, technical and legal issues of 
complexity it becomes increasingly clear that the influence of social and organizational complexity is 
heavily underestimated with respect to planning processes and procedures, also in the case of the LIP 
Oosterweel Link. Since complexity in its many aspects seems behind all those LIP-struggles, we need to 
switch from the prevailing and often linear technocratic planning approach to an approach that holds in the 
encounter with complexity. That is why we wanted to explore the coevolutionary character of the whole 
process. We hosted both vested and civic actors of the Oosterweel Link case in a round table discussion 
and confronted them with the project history again. The discussion proved successful with respect to (1) 
acknowledging the encountered complexity and the utility of a coevolutionary perspective in this respect 
and (2) understanding the made choices and identifying the crucial moments that made or broke this 
coevolutionary process. What did coevolution add to the LIP Oosterweel Link? What did it imply for the 
actors’ roles?  
The participants argued that the key for working with complexity is to release the process and to shift focus 
from project output or implementation towards the process of co-creation. They identified click-moments 
where coevolution flourished or got stuck in the case. Furthermore, they agreed on the necessity of a more 
integrated way of working, implying a less fragmented government. There should be a balance of 
interaction from the beginning on and control (decisions or ‘clicks’ should also be made in case of a broad 
support base). The importance of a mediator or intendant was acknowledged in this case to balance 
between interaction and control. It seemed more difficult for the participants to decide on the best 
moments and powers for control: what the click-moment includes and who finally decides.  
From a coevolutionary perspective, observing all (inter)actors and agendas at stake (Figure 2), we could 
oversee the merits of the various rounds of opposition and delay. Thanks to the first citizen movements 
and their opposition, the project’s scope incorporated the liveability aspects, environmental (and) health 
aspects. Though there were some moments of convergence, the conflict model prevailed in those rounds. 
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When Ringland came into the debate, this steadily changed. The three citizen movements closely 
collaborated, but kept their own ‘specialties’. Ringland actively addressed the government and project 
management team BAM with its capping ideas, and had in the meantime built a substantial support base. 
By carrying out studies and establishing the Ringland Academy, it also gained the support of many 
academics and experts in the field. Ringland prompted the need for a mediator (or intendant) to align all 
stakeholders, herewith inviting themselves and the citizen movements to the decision making process, 
mediated by the intendant. Since then a cocreated or coevolutionary model dominated, based on trust, 
transparency and interaction. A first compromise was signed between all involved parties and the concrete 
elaboration, engagements and planning procedures are currently seriously being discussed. Soon we will 
see if the project finally lands…  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Due to the rapid growth of cities and their social, cultural, economic and technological evolution, the 
policies and legislative instruments need to adapt to this change. By 2050, United-Nations estimate 6.4 
billion people
1
 are expected to be living in cities (Riffat et al., 2016), with relevant consequences on 
resources, emissions and services
2
. In spite of this, the development of Europe‟s cities and the relations 
among them constitute one of the most important driving force for the future of Europe (Rotmans and Van 
Asselt, 2000).  
The complexity of the urban phenomena needs to be investigated in an integrated manner, through the 
management of the systems and processes making up the city. Indeed, the city is recognised in literature 
as a complex, open and adaptive system, that evolves in time and space (Portugali et al., 2012), (Healy, 
                                                            
1
 The recent report by the United-Nations (2014) estimate 3.9 billion urban population in 2014 itself. 
2
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Urban_Europe_%E2%80%94_statistics_on_cities,_towns_and_suburbs 
